Competition and Coordination in Single-Supplier Multiple-Retailer Supply Chain

Jiahang Du () and Quansheng Lei
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Jiahang Du: Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Quansheng Lei: Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

Chapter Chapter 5 in Recent Developments in Data Science and Business Analytics, 2018, pp 45-53 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We analyze a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a single supplier and multiple retailers. The retailers make sales effort to attract the potential costumers. The retail channels compete in price at the end market. We find out the equilibrium solution in centralized case and decentralized case. Then we analyze the effect of total supply chain profit with respect to effort level. We show that the supply chain efficiency decreases and then weakly increases as the number of retailer increases. We also coordinate the supply chain with two-part tariff mechanism and find out the corresponding parameters. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate our model.

Keywords: Dual-channel; Effort level; Multiple retailers; Two-part tariff mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:prbchp:978-3-319-72745-5_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-72745-5_5

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