Incentives, Autonomous Motivation, and Bank Managers’ Socially Responsible Behavior

Vincent Bouchet, Stefan Linder () and Nicolas Mottis
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Vincent Bouchet: Ecole Polytechnique
Stefan Linder: ESSEC Business School

A chapter in The Relational View of Economics, 2022, pp 159-190 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract For fostering Socially Responsible Behavior (SRB) of their managers, firms increasingly consider tying managers’ bonuses to the achievement of certain environmental, social, or societal objectives. Yet, we still know very little about the actual effects of such incentives for SRB. In particular, it is unclear whether such incentives are effective or whether they risk to (partially) “crowd-out” individuals’ autonomous motivation for SRB. Based on two vignette experiments with managers, we provide first empirical evidence on this matter. Financial rewards seem inefficient for enhancing managers’ engagement in SRB, but do not seem to crowd-out their autonomous motivation to engage in SRB. Therefore, top managers who wish to foster SRB are better served by focusing on attracting and retaining individuals who are autonomously motivated for SRB rather than on to trying to foster SRB by implementing SRB-related remuneration systems.

Keywords: Socially responsible behavior; Corporate social responsibility; Motivation; Incentives; Rewards; Crowding-out (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:recchp:978-3-030-86526-9_9

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-86526-9_9

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