Asymmetric Knowledge Coordination Through the Manager-Director Hybrid Role

Lucio Biggiero () and Robert Magnuszewski ()
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Lucio Biggiero: University of L’Aquila
Robert Magnuszewski: University of L’Aquila

Chapter Chapter 7 in Inter-firm Networks, 2023, pp 209-252 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This coordination mechanism occurs by appointing a manager of company A into the board of company B. Therefore, the person who is giving form to that relationship is playing a hybrid manager-director role. We refer to it as the hybrid interlock (HINT)Hybrid interlocks (HINT), which implies an Asymmetric Knowledge Exchange (AKE)Asymmetric Knowledge Exchange, because company A gives operative knowledgeOperative knowledge to B in exchange for the more precious strategic one. We argue that it makes sense to “force” this asymmetry by supposing that A “exploits” B, though only future specific empirical studies could confirm if and to what extent this is actually a form of exploitation. Therefore, an unequal exchange performed by the asymmetric connection between companies makes M2D relationships very interesting. Consistently with the AKE, we decided to represent these links as directed, flowing from A to B to indicate a competitive advantage residing on the company where the person covers the role of manager (see Methodological Appendix), and assuming a corresponding coordination influence. A strong support for this conceptual and methodological choice comes from the fact that in each pair a company is always only on one side of the exchange, be it the operative or strategic knowledgeStrategic knowledge provider, and never on both sides. Therefore, these relationships are truly asymmetric, and consequently, unlike M2M and D2DDirector-to-Director (D2D), the M2D EASINEASIN and E+N networks are directed. Further, when merging the three layers (M2M, D2D and M2D) into the multi-layer ALL networkALL network, it is the direction of M2D connections that determines those of the ALL networkALL network, which we have discussed in Chap. 4 . This chapter replicates the same structure of the previous ones that are dedicated to the other two types of coordination forms. Hence, right after the statistical analysis in the first section, and with the correlation analysis between economic size attributes and centrality indexes follows in the second section, then the chapter roceeds with the network analysis of the whole and main componentComponentMain Component networks at the EASIN and E+N levels. As for M2M and D2D, these two networks are also collapsed in inter-sectors and inter-country aggregations. Next, clusters, components and cliques analyses do follow. Finally, heavy-tailHeavy-tail, key-players (bridging companies) and assortativityAssortativity analyses close the chapter.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-17389-9_7

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