Market Power, Rents, and Deadweight Welfare Loss in Collegiate Swimming

Jill Harris and Audrey Kline
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Audrey Kline: University of Louisville

Chapter Chapter 7 in The Economics of Aquatic Sports, 2020, pp 59-65 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract As with all collegiate sports in the United States, athletes do not earn income from their labor efforts. This is due, primarily, to the structure of the NCAA as an incidental cartel. This cartel market power translates to price ceilings on wages and quotas on the number of athletes employed. On average, most college swimmers are generating at least the value of their athletic scholarship. However, some generate far more. This lays the groundwork for future work on exploitation of student-athletes and estimation of the deadweight welfare loss in aquatic sport.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-52340-4_7

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