Doping on Deck: The Prisoner’s Dilemma of Performance-Enhancing Drugs

Jill Harris

Chapter Chapter 8 in The Economics of Aquatic Sports, 2020, pp 67-75 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Athletes from Olympians to NFL players are under constant pressure to be bigger, stronger, faster, and better than their competitors. Increasingly, athletes turn to Performance-Enhancing Drugs (PEDs). PEDs create a Prisoner’s Dilemma within sporting organizations as athletes attempt to keep up with their opponents. This chapter addresses two questions. (1) Is doping a rational strategy and (2) Does doping provide a significant financial advantage to other clean, or nondoping, swimmers? A strategic form game indicates doping is an equilibrium strategy. Simulations from a panel data set of elite swimmers indicate the financial advantage from doping is minimal for US swimmers.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-52340-4_8

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