Competition Between Homogenous Terrorist Organizations: A General Model

Nina Ismael ()
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Nina Ismael: BwConsulting

Chapter Chapter 5 in Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups, 2020, pp 55-70 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In general, it is assumed that a competitive environment fosters terrorist activity. Bloom’s (2004) outbidding theory as well as the idea of differentiation proposed by Conrad and Greene (2015) suggests that rivalry of terrorist groups either quantitively increases terrorist activity or changes attack behavior qualitatively, resulting in more spectacular events. According to Bloom, a decline in the number of terrorist incidents is merely the result of lacking support. If the support base terrorist groups want to win over refuses terrorism, then organizations tend to reduce their activities instead of trying to outbid each other.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-030-51307-8_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-51307-8_5

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