Conclusion

Nina Ismael ()
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Nina Ismael: BwConsulting

Chapter Chapter 7 in Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups, 2020, pp 83-84 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A major concern of terrorist groups is to ensure sustainability and longevity. By committing attacks of varying degrees, terrorists can attract resources, which enable an organization to improve its chances of achieving stated goals. However, support is assumed to be provided to the most capable group, implying that terrorist groups are incentivized to signal their capabilities. This is where the outbidding hypothesis developed by Bloom (2004) draws on. In an environment, where several terrorist organizations are competing for a given supportive mass, terrorists are supposed to increase their activities, either quantitatively or qualitatively. Although Bloom’s idea is intuitively appealing, it is merely supported by anecdotical and few empirical evidence.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-51307-8_7

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