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Proverbs, Power, and Conditional Thinking: Toward a Critical Economics of Folk Wisdom

Maurizio Bovi
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Maurizio Bovi: Sapienza University of Rome

Chapter Chapter 10 in The Invisible Handshake, 2026, pp 83-88 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter develops a critical economics of folk wisdom by analyzing proverbs as vernacular heuristics that both illuminate and distort economic reasoning. Rejecting portrayals of proverbs as timeless truths or mere superstition, the analysis argues that conditional thinking is a condition for thought: proverbs rarely encode universal rules but instead offer context‑dependent strategies for navigating risk, cooperation, incentives, and distributive conflict. Functioning as informal institutions, these sayings shape expectations and provide Schelling‑type focal points for coordinating behavior under uncertainty. Yet their rhetorical authority—rooted in anonymity and rhythmic condensation—also naturalizes power asymmetries, justifies social hierarchies, and individualizes structural disadvantage. Gendered and poverty‑related proverbs exemplify how cultural scripts influence epistemic authority and attributions of economic success or failure. The chapter also examines tensions within proverbial traditions, such as the contrast between “Unity is strength” and “Self‑help is the best help”: rather than revealing incoherence, such contradictions reflect the complexity of economic life and the need to adjust judgment to shifting conditions. The chapter concludes that proverbs constitute essential empirical evidence for everyday economic cognition while requiring critical normative scrutiny, outlining an agenda for social scientists.

Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-032-25194-7_10

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-25194-7_10

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