Eight Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failure Under Variable Electorates

Dan S. Felsenthal () and Hannu Nurmi
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Dan S. Felsenthal: University of Haifa
Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

Chapter Chapter 5 in Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, 2017, pp 63-84 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter expands the illustration and analysis regarding the susceptibility of eight voting procedures to two types of what are generally known as No-Show paradoxes. Following the article by Felsenthal and Tideman (2013), the two paradoxes are denoted as P-TOP and P-BOT paradoxes. According to the P-TOP paradox it is possible that if candidate x has been elected by a given electorate then, ceteris paribus, another candidate, y, may be elected if additional voters join the electorate who rank x at the top of their preference ordering. Similarly, according to the P-BOT paradox it is possible that if candidate y has not been elected by a given electorate then, ceteris paribus, y may be elected if additional voters join the electorate who rank y at the bottom of their preference ordering. Voting procedures that are susceptible to these paradoxes are considered to be afflicted with a particularly serious defect because instead of encouraging voters to participate in an election and vote according to their true preference orderings, they may inhibit voters from participating in an election and thereby undermine the rationale for conducting elections.

Keywords: Elections; No-show paradoxes; Non-monotonicity; Voting paradoxes; Voting methods; Voting procedures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-319-51061-3_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-51061-3_5

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