Microcredit Revisited: Towards More Flexible Loan Contracts

Kazunari Tsukada ()
Additional contact information
Kazunari Tsukada: Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO)

Chapter Chapter 2 in Seasonality and Microcredit, 2014, pp 9-19 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Group liability and a fixed repayment schedule with frequent installments are prominent features of microcredit loan contracts. These rules make it possible for lenders to reduce lending costs and provide borrowers with appropriate incentives to repay. Sometimes they facilitate mutual insurance among members and improve the welfare of borrowers by providing a commitment device that induces saving-like behaviors. However, they also impose considerable burdens on borrowers. This chapter reviews selected literature on the rigidity and flexibility of microcredit contracts and provides an overview of the microfinance revolution and its current presence in various parts of the world.

Keywords: Group liability; Repayment mechanism; Commitment device; Microcredit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-4-431-55010-5_2

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9784431550105

DOI: 10.1007/978-4-431-55010-5_2

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in SpringerBriefs in Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().