Strategic Audit Policies Without Commitment

Kalyan Chatterjee (), Sanford Morton () and Arijit Mukherji
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Kalyan Chatterjee: The Pennsylvania State University
Sanford Morton: Private Consultant
Arijit Mukherji: Private Consultant

A chapter in Pareto Optimality, Game Theory And Equilibria, 2008, pp 407-436 from Springer

Abstract: This chapter constructs and analyzes a simple auditing model in order to answer questions concerning three principal issues: (i) the information contained in the report, (ii) commitment to the audit policy, and (iii) audit effort. The approach taken is based on the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We attempt to examine the nature of such equilibria and arguments as to which equilibrium one would expect to observe.

Keywords: audit policies; audit game; commitment; perfect Bayesian equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-77247-9_15

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