A Survey of Bicooperative Games

Jesús M. Bilbao (), Julio R. Fernández (), Nieves Jiménez () and Jorge J. López ()
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Jesús M. Bilbao: University of Seville
Julio R. Fernández: University of Seville
Nieves Jiménez: University of Seville
Jorge J. López: University of Seville

A chapter in Pareto Optimality, Game Theory And Equilibria, 2008, pp 187-216 from Springer

Abstract: The aim of the current chapter is to study several solution concepts for bicooperative games. For these games introduced by Bilbao [1], we define a one-point solution called the Shapley value, as this value can be interpreted in a similar way to the classic Shapley value for cooperative games. The first result is an axiomatic characterization of this value. Next, we define the core and the Weber set of a bicooperative game and prove that the core of a bicooperative game is always contained in the Weber set. Finally, we introduce a special class of bicooperative games, the so-called bisupermodular games, and show that these games are the only ones in which the core and the Weber set coincide.

Keywords: bicooperative game; bisupermodular game; Bore; Shapley value; Weber set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-77247-9_8

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