A Note on Generalized Nash Games Played on Networks

Mauro Passacantando () and Fabio Raciti ()
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Mauro Passacantando: University of Pisa
Fabio Raciti: University of Catania

A chapter in Nonlinear Analysis, Differential Equations, and Applications, 2021, pp 365-380 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We investigate a generalized Nash equilibrium problem where players are modeled as nodes of a network and the utility function of each player depends on his/her own action as well as on the actions of his/her neighbors in the network. In the case of a quadratic reference model with shared constraints we are able to derive the variational solution of the game as a series expansion which involves the powers of the adjacency matrix, thus extending a previous result. Our analysis is illustrated by means of some numerical examples.

Keywords: Network games; Generalized Nash equilibrium; Variational inequalities; Network centrality measures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-72563-1_16

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