Blockchain Incentive Design and Analysis

Jianyu Niu () and Chen Feng ()
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Jianyu Niu: Southern University of Science and Technology
Chen Feng: The University of British Columbia (Okanagan Campus)

A chapter in Handbook on Blockchain, 2022, pp 119-156 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The Bitcoin white paper introduced the blockchain technology to realize a decentralized electronic cash system that does not rely on a central authority. A major novelty behind the technology is the incentive design, in which participating nodes obtain rewards by creating blocks in a longest chain. The incentive design is paramount for a secure blockchain system as shown in many recent works. In this chapter, we take a close look at the incentive design of three influential blockchain protocols including Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Bitcoin-NG. For each protocol, we present the potential incentive-based attacks and go through several theoretical results to characterize the impact of these attacks. We hope that at the end of our journey, our readers can have a deeper understanding of blockchain incentive designs and analysis.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spochp:978-3-031-07535-3_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-07535-3_4

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