Preferences over Mixed Manna

Alexander Karpov

A chapter in Data Analysis and Optimization, 2023, pp 169-178 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A mixed manna contains alternatives that are the best for some agents, and alternatives that are the never best for all agents. We define a new class of Condorcet domains that are called GF-domains. GF-domains are unique Condorcet domains that are weakly minimally rich, semi-connected and contain a pair of mutually reverse preference orders. GF-domains are single-peaked on a circle that leads to a clear interpretation.

Keywords: Structured preferences; Majority voting; Single-peaked on a circle; Circular city model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spochp:978-3-031-31654-8_11

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783031316548

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-31654-8_11

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Optimization and Its Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().