 European Union and NATO Cooperation in Hybrid ThreatsMikhail Kostarakos
A chapter in Handbook for Management of Threats, 2023, pp 405-423 from Springer Abstract: Abstract The tenths of millions of casualties of the two World Wars of twentieth century and a possibility of a thermonuclear war, reminded to the decision-makers and to the politico-military scholars that another way should be found in order to impose our own will to the adversaries. The term “hybrid force” was attributed for the first time to the USMC that historically has demonstrated itself as such, capable of conducting operations within both the conventional and unconventional realms of warfare described as “Hybrid Wars.” The need for a new concept was due to the realization that the so far well-known models of war and peace were not adequate to describe a rapidly evolving strategic international landscape. “Hybrid Warfare” has created confusion to the terminology of our vocabulary and should be seen as a manifestation of our inability to fit current security challenges within previously delineated logical terms for conceiving war. A USMC military theorist, LtCol (retired) Frank Hoffman significantly contributed to the popularization of the “Hybrid” term with his widely accepted definition: “Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of nonstate actors. They incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. These multimodal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects. The effects can be gained at all levels of war.” NATO’s approach and reaction to Hybrid Threats and Warfare can be described as military-centric, pragmatic, not over-obsessed by the nature of Hybrid Threats, based on and sustaining Comprehensive Approach and finally, effectively protecting the Allied Centers of Gravity, which are the Allied Solidarity and Cohesion. The EU keeping distances from whatever has to do with the military, avoided the term “Hybrid Warfare” and preferred the term “Hybrid Threats.” The EU’s response to Hybrid Threats, can be seen as a mix of existing measures together with new attempts to improve situational awareness and address vulnerabilities. In general, the discussion on Hybrid Threats significantly contributed to further NATO-EU coordination. While both the EU and NATO, see their MS and the Allies as the first responders in Hybrid crises, it became clear that closer cooperation between both organizations can make their assistance more focused and more effective. Both organizations avoided on purpose to make institutional or crucial changes to their internal processes and policy proposals, simply trying to fix their internal vulnerabilities and inadequacies vis a vis modern critical challenges and threats. Hybrid intensified and facilitated the need of both organizations to come and work closer together for the protection of their role, their interests, their assets, and the protection of their citizens and their way of living. Keywords: Hybrid threats; NATO—EU cooperation; Hybrid crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spochp:978-3-031-39542-0_20 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-39542-0_20 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Springer Optimization and Its Applications from Springer |
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