Exploring Network Centrality Through the Lens of Game Theory

Mauro Passacantando () and Fabio Raciti ()
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Mauro Passacantando: University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Business and Law
Fabio Raciti: University of Catania, Department of Mathematics and Computer Science

Chapter 22 in Convex and Variational Analysis with Applications, 2026, pp 495-512 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We study a class of network games characterized by local complementarities, global congestion effects, and a bounded strategy space. Our first contribution is a representation formula for the Nash equilibrium that expresses players’ equilibrium strategies via a series expansion. Building on this, we define a novel centrality measure derived from the Welfare function evaluated at equilibrium. We then compare our proposed measure with four classical ranking methods and the more recent information centrality, using several well-known datasets.

Keywords: Network games; Nash equilibrium; Network centrality measures; Social welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-07860-5_22

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