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Noncooperative Satellite Range Scheduling

Antonio José Vázquez Álvarez and Richard Scott Erwin
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Antonio José Vázquez Álvarez: National Research Council
Richard Scott Erwin: Space Vehicles Directorate, Kirtland

Chapter Chapter 5 in An Introduction to Optimal Satellite Range Scheduling, 2015, pp 77-106 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In previous work the authors have provided the first game-theoretic approach to the Satellite Range Scheduling problem, modeling the problem as a Stackelberg game and computing its equilibrium in polynomial time. Compared to previous work which focused on the perfect information case, this chapter introduces several variants of this problem with limited information, sheds some light on alternative models, and provides further insight on the relations with the centralized version of the problem. (This research was performed while the author held a National Research Council Research Associateship Award at the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL).)

Keywords: Perfect Information; Payoff Vector; Stackelberg Game; Graph Element; Stackelberg Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spochp:978-3-319-25409-8_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-25409-8_5

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