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A Class of Location Games with Type Dependent Facilities

Imma Curiel ()
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Imma Curiel: Anton de Kom University of Suriname

A chapter in Spatial Interaction Models, 2017, pp 39-52 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Cooperative and non-cooperative games arising from location problems on an undirected graph with facilities of different types are considered. The nodes of the graph correspond to players. Distances between the players are measured along the edges of the graph.The graph is assumed to be connected and the distance between two nodes is the length of a shortest path from one node to the other. Each player has a need for a facility of each type. The intensity of the need of each player for a certain facility depends on the type of the facility. A cooperative game in which the number of facilities that a coalition is allowed to build depends on the size of the coalition is introduced. A coalition can only build a facility in a node corresponding to a member of the coalition. A cooperative game arising from such a facility location problem need not be balanced. Conditions that guarantee the balancedness of the game are discussed. A non-cooperative game in which the pure strategies of the players corresponds to choosing a facility to be built in their geographical location is introduced. Conditions that guarantee that the Nash equilibria of this game correspond to the complete set of facilities being chosen are studied.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Location Problem; Cooperative Game; Pure Strategy; Cost Allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spochp:978-3-319-52654-6_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_3

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