A Game Theoretic Approach to an Emergency Units Location Problem

Vito Fragnelli (), Stefano Gagliardo () and Fabio Gastaldi ()
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Vito Fragnelli: Università del Piemonte Orientale
Stefano Gagliardo: Università degli Studi di Genova
Fabio Gastaldi: Università del Piemonte Orientale

A chapter in Spatial Interaction Models, 2017, pp 171-191 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we consider the problem of locating emergency units in a given area, defining a suitable class of TU-games. The Shapley value results to be a very good solution for this class of games. A simple formula for computing the Shapley value is derived. A real-world example and some comments conclude.

Keywords: Location Problem; Cooperative Game; Candidate Location; Marginal Contribution; Emergency Unit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_8

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