Poly-agent Systems Theory: Evolution Model and its Applications

Kyoichi Kijima
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Kyoichi Kijima: Tokyo Institute of Technology

Chapter 97 in Synergy Matters, 2002, pp 577-582 from Springer

Abstract: Conclusion This paper possesses at least the following three original contributions. (1) Each agent is characterized by its internal model (i.e., a pair of its subjective pay-off matrix and interpretation function). (2) To discuss the dynamic evolution process we introduce what we call a two-step approach, i.e., first calculating HNE for symbiotic hypergames and, then applying ESC to the result. (3) We clarify that HNE is concept defined on ordinal payoff while ESC is essentially calculated with cardinal payoff. Furthermore, we explained these ideas through an interesting example.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Internal Model; Pure Strategy; Replicator Dynamic; Evolutionary Stable Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-306-47467-5_97

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DOI: 10.1007/0-306-47467-0_97

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