EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Cognition In Spatial Dispersion Games

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong () and Michael Maier ()
Additional contact information
Douglas V. DeJong: University of Iowa
Michael Maier: University of Iowa

Chapter Chapter 8 in Experimental Business Research, 2005, pp 185-202 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In common-interest spatial-dispersion games the agents’ common goal is to choose distinct locations. We experimentally investigate the role of cognition in such games and compare it with the role of cognition in spatial matching games. In our setup cognition matters because agents may be differentially aware of the dispersion opportunities that are created by the history of the game. We ask whether cognitive constraints limit the agents’ ability to achieve dispersion and, if there is dispersion, whether these constraints affect the mode by which agents achieve dispersion. Our main finding is that strategic interaction magnifies the role of cognitive constraints. Specifically, with cognitive constraints, pairs of agents fail to solve a dispersion problem that poses little or no problem for individual agents playing against themselves. When we remove the cognitive constraints in our design, pairs of agents solve the same problem just as well as individuals do. In addition, we find that when playing against themselves agents do not change the mode by which they solve the dispersion problem when our design removes the cognitive constraints.

Keywords: Coordination Problem; Information Treatment; Coordination Game; Unique Optimal Solution; Dispersion Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Cognition in Spatial Dispersion Games (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: Cognition in Spatial Dispersion Games (2005) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-24244-6_8

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9780387242446

DOI: 10.1007/0-387-24244-9_8

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-23
Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-24244-6_8