Consistent Conjectures, Equilibria and Dynamic Games

Alain Jean-Marie and Mabel Tidball

Chapter Chapter 5 in Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications, 2005, pp 93-109 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We discuss in this paper the relationships between conjectures, conjectural equilibria, consistency and Nash equilibria in the classical theory of discrete-time dynamic games. We propose a theoretical framework in which we define conjectural equilibria with several degrees of consistency. In particular, we introduce feedback-consistency, and we prove that the corresponding equilibria and Nash-feedback equilibria of the game coincide. We discuss the relationship between these results and previous studies based on differential games and supergames.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Dynamic Game; Static Game; Namic Game; Generalize Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-24602-4_5

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DOI: 10.1007/0-387-24602-9_5

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