Cooperative Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information

Leon A. Petrosjan

Chapter Chapter 6 in Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications, 2005, pp 111-134 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The definition of cooperative game in characteristic function form with incomplete Information on a game tree is given. The notions of optimality principle and based on it solution concepts are introduced. The new concept of “imputation distribution procedure” is defined connected with the basic definitions of time-consistency and strongly time-consistency. Sufficient conditions of the existence of time-consistent solutions are derived. For a large class of games where these conditions cannot be satisfied the regularization procedure is developed and new characteristic function is constructed. The “regularized” core is defined and strongly time-consistency proved. The Special case of stochastic games is also investigated in details.

Keywords: Incomplete Information; Cooperative Game; Optimal Trajectory; Extensive Form; Dynamic Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/0-387-24602-9_6

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