Solutions to Principal-Agent Problems in Firms

Gary J. Miller

Chapter 14. in Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 2005, pp 349-370 from Springer

Keywords: Moral Hazard; Credible Commitment; Golden Parachute; Cash Poster; Residual Owner (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/0-387-25092-1_15

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