Nash Equilibria for Large-Population Linear Stochastic Systems of Weakly Coupled Agents

Minyi Huang, Roland P. Malhamé and Peter E. Caines

Chapter Chapter 9 in Analysis, Control and Optimization of Complex Dynamic Systems, 2005, pp 215-252 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We consider dynamic games in large population conditions where the agents evolve according to non-uniform dynamics and are weakly coupled via their dynamics and the individual costs. A state aggregation technique is developed to obtain a set of decentralized control laws for the individuals which possesses an F-Nash equilibrium property. An attraction property of the mass behaviour is established. The methodology and the results contained in this paper reveal novel behavioral properties of the relationship of any given individual with respect to the mass of individuals in large-scale noncooperative systems of weakly coupled agents.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Noncooperative Game; Virtual Agent; Individual Cost; Fixed Point Property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-25477-7_9

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DOI: 10.1007/0-387-25477-3_9

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