On Pareto Improving Commodity Tax Changes Under Fiscal Competition
Alain Crombrugghe and
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Alain Crombrugghe: Facultés Universitaires Notre Dame de la Paix
Chapter Chapter 20 in Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, 2006, pp 491-506 from Springer
Abstract This paper shows that when a ‘noncooperative fiscal equilibrium’ of the Mintz-Tulkens 1986 model of tax competition is inefficient, Pareto improving changes are positive for the taxes of both regions, under concavity of the regions’ welfare functions. It also identifies a class of such equilibria that are always efficient.
Keywords: Private Good; Public Economic; Indifference Curve; Welfare Level; Local Public Good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: On Pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition (1990)
Working Paper: On Pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition (1990)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-25534-7_24
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