Surplus-Sharing Local Games in Dynamic Exchange Processes

Henry Tulkens and Shmuel Zamir ()

Chapter Chapter 2 in Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, 2006, pp 49-62 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A well-known property of so-called “MDP processes”1 is monotonicity in terms of the utilities of the agents, due to the sharing among the latter of a “surplus” of numeraire generated at each point of their trajectories. In this paper, we focus our attention on the somewhat neglected question of how this sharing takes place, and we propose to use game-theoretic concepts and methods for answering it. A byproduct of this enquiry is the formulation of a “nontâtonnement” process that seems to be of independent interest.

Keywords: Public Good; Distribution Profile; Solution Concept; Efficient Allocation; Incentive Compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Surplus-sharing Local Games in Dynamic Exchange Processes (1979)
Working Paper: Surplus-sharing local games in dynamic exchange processes (1979)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-25534-7_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9780387255347

DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-25534-7_3

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().