 An Economic Model of International Negotiations Relating to Transfrontier PollutionChapter Chapter 5 in Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, 2006, pp 107-121 from Springer Abstract: Abstract This paper formulates a mathematical model of negotiations taking place between delegates of countries whose citizens share a common resource, viz. the ”Southern Bight” (i.e. the southern part of the North Sea) and are concerned about its quality for various and possibly conflicting reasons. The negotiations process, proved to converge to a Pareto optimum of the international economy, is formulated in terms of gradual domestic abatements of pollutants, with a hydrodynamic and ecological model called upon for expressing the effects of these abatements on the quality of the sea. In addition, compensatory payments among countries are defined which are shown to cover all abatement costs, to break even and to be such that for each country individually, benefits are larger than the net costs they incur. The concluding section raises the free riding issue in this context, and considers the relation between reaching an optimum in this way and the ”polluters pay principle”. Keywords: Public Good; Abatement Cost; Negotiation Process; International Negotiation; Feasible State (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-25534-7_7 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-25534-7_7 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Springer Books from Springer |
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