The Acid Rain Game as a Resource Allocation Process, with Application to Negotiations Between Finland, Russia and Estonia

Veijo Kaitala, Karl‑Göran Mäler and Henry Tulkens
Additional contact information
Veijo Kaitala: Helsinki University of Technology

Chapter Chapter 7 in Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, 2006, pp 135-152 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We consider optimal cooperation in transboundary air pollution abatement among several countries under incomplete information, i.e., local information only on marginal emission abatement costs and damage costs. Directions of emission abatement in each country are determined that generate a succession of emissions programs shown to converge to an economic optimum. A cost sharing scheme, that results from appropriately designed international transfers, guarantees that the individual costs of all parties are nonincreasing along the path towards the optimum. A version of Maäler’s (1989) “acid rain game” is used for a numerical application.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Public Good; Abatement Cost; Damage Function; Damage Cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-25534-7_9

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9780387255347

DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-25534-7_9

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().