On The Subtleties of the Principal-Agent Model

Thomas Hemmer
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Thomas Hemmer: University of Houston

Chapter Chapter 6 in Essays in Accounting Theory in Honour of Joel S. Demski, 2007, pp 123-142 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this essay I focus on the equilibrium relation between the “risk” in a performance measure and the “strength” of the controlling agent’s “incentives.” The main motivation is that a large (mainly empirical) literature has developed postulating that the key implication of the principal-agent model is that this relation be negative. I first show that a standard principal-agent model, e.g., Holmström (1979), offers no equilibrium prediction about the relation between “risk” and “incentives.” Next, I show that except in the highly stylized limiting Brownian version of Holmström and Milgrom (1987), this model doesn’t yield a directional prediction for the equilibrium relation between “risk” and “incentives” either. This is due to the general property that risk arises endogenously in such principal-agent models. This, in turn, establishes that while the mixed empirical evidence on this relation may be useful from a descriptive vantage point, it does not shed any light on the validity of the principal-agent theory.

Keywords: Agency Theory; Incentives; Risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-30399-4_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-30399-4_6

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