Combining Game Theory and Risk Analysis in Counterterrorism: A Smallpox Example

David L. Banks () and Steven Anderson ()
Additional contact information
David L. Banks: Duke University, Institute of Statistics and Decision Sciences
Steven Anderson: U. S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research

A chapter in Statistical Methods in Counterterrorism, 2006, pp 9-22 from Springer

Keywords: False Alarm; Game Theory; Normal Random Variable; Defense Strategy; Cost Matrix (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-35209-1_2

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9780387352091

DOI: 10.1007/0-387-35209-0_2

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().