A Dea Game

William W. Cooper, Lawrence Seiford and Kaoru Tone
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William W. Cooper: University of Texas
Kaoru Tone: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

Chapter 15 in Data Envelopment Analysis, 2007, pp 405-421 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we have introduced a consensus-making method in a multiple criteria environment using a combination of DEA and cooperative game theory. It is demonstrated that both DEA max and min games have the same Shapley value. Problems like the one exemplified in this chapter are usually solved by means of (among others) conventional custom a single criterion decision or a fixed weights rule. These approaches are not always “rational.” The proposed scheme has diverse applications in areas, such as, cost or burden sharing in international organizations, e.g., United Nations, NATO, UNESCO and so forth, research grant allocation to applicants by a foundation, and resource distribution for R&D. These problems are multifaceted and should be solved in a cooperative frame-work. The DEA game proposed in this chapter can be a promising method for solving these important problems and will open a new dimension to cooperative game theory.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-45283-8_15

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