The Nature and Functions of Tied Grants

Bob Searle and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez ()
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Bob Searle: Australian Government

Chapter Chapter 13 in Fiscal Equalization, 2007, pp 403-434 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Tied (or conditional) grants are typically a key elements of most intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems. They are an effective tool for central adn upper level governments to pursue a variety of objectives but in order to understand how they work, tied grants need to be seen as part of the whole system of intergovernmental fiscal relations operating in a nation. This paper discusses many aspects of the design and management of tied grants, and concludes that they need far more careful consideration than is often given to them. Before discussing specific issues relating to tied grants, however, we think it will be useful to clarify some terminology and review the place and role of tied grants in the overall context of intergovernmental fiscal relations.

Keywords: Central Government; National Government; Fiscal Decentralization; Australian Government Publishing; Fiscal Capacity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-48988-9_16

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DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-48988-9_16

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