The Perspective of Law

Francesco Parisi

Chapter 15 in Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, 2008, pp 227-263 from Springer

Abstract: The enlightened conception of the separation of powers holds that law should be made by the legislature, interpreted by the judiciary, and enforced by the executive branch of government. Public choice theory provides a solid foundation for the appraisal of this traditional formula. The findings of public choice theory, while supporting much of the traditional wisdom, pose several challenges to the theoretical foundations of these constitutional principles. In the following pages, I shall revisit these important questions considering the issue of institutional design through the lenses of public choice theory.

Keywords: Public Choice; Agency Problem; Legal Rule; External Cost; Political Representation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-75870-1_15

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