Conversions and Other Forms of Exit in U.S. Agricultural Cooperatives

Fabio R. Chaddad and Michael L. Cook
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Fabio R. Chaddad: Ibmec Business School
Michael L. Cook: University of Missouri-Columbia

Chapter Chapter 4 in Vertical Markets and Cooperative Hierarchies, 2007, pp 61-72 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper discusses exit strategies in U.S. agricultural cooperatives. Compared to other mutual organizations, liquidations and conversions have not been common in U.S. agriculture. We attribute this phenomenon to the “stickiness” of the cooperative organizational form in agriculture. Hypothesized factors that lead to this conclusion include existence of considerable economic incentives for the continued role of cooperatives, low member pecuniary incentives to pursue an exit strategy, and lack of disruptive institutional and market changes. We conclude that if property right constraints continue to be ameliorated with selective incentives and innovative structures, producers will be more likely to invest in cooperatives.

Keywords: Ownership Structure; Equity Capital; Insurance Industry; Financial Exchange; Exit Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-1-4020-5543-0_4

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DOI: 10.1007/1-4020-5543-0_4

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