Lock-In of Farmers in Agricultural Cooperatives

Søren Vincents Svendsen
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Søren Vincents Svendsen: The Aarhus School of Business

Chapter Chapter 7 in Vertical Markets and Cooperative Hierarchies, 2007, pp 113-135 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Structural changes in the agricultural set-up challenge the value of traditional practices in cooperatives. The major sector development causes a lock-in effect for individual farmers and gives rise to non-Pareto-optimal outcomes for individual farmer members. Constitutional economics may be a theoretical source for reviving the effect of exit by addressing potential adjustments to the traditional cooperative institutional set-up and, thereby, generating more stable equilibria in collective bargaining processes between farmers. The approach focuses on voting rules, investment levels as well as individual positive and negative rights in farmers’ collective actions and calls for adjustment of traditional practices in agricultural cooperatives.

Keywords: Collective Action; Joint Action; Vote Rule; Collective Decision; Individual Farmer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1007/1-4020-5543-0_7

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