Competition between Adaptive Agents: Learning and Collective Efficiency

Damien Challet ()
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Damien Challet: Oxford University, Theoretical Physics

Chapter 5 in Collectives and the Design of Complex Systems, 2004, pp 145-160 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We use the minority game and some of its variants to show how efficiency depends on learning in models of agents competing for limited resources. Exact results from statistical physics give a clear understanding of the phenomenology and open the way to the study of inverse problems. What agents can optimize and how well are discussed in detail.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Pure Strategy; Adaptive Agent; Minority Game; Majority Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-1-4419-8909-3_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-8909-3_5

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