Consistent Demands for Coalition Formation

Benny Moldovanu and Eyal Winter
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Benny Moldovanu: University of Michigan, Department of Economics
Eyal Winter: The Hebrew University, Department of Economics

Chapter Essay 10 in Essays in Game Theory, 1994, pp 129-140 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In equilibria of a bargaining model of coalition formation and payoff division (see Selten, 1981) players appear to form demands for their participation in a coalition. These demands have several appealing features. We characterize the sets of semi-stable and stable demand vectors for general NTU games using consistency requirements that relate the demands formed in the initial game to demands formed by subgroups considering their outside options.

Keywords: Cooperative Game; Solution Concept; Coalition Formation; Grand Coalition; Assignment Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-1-4612-2648-2_10

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_10

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