The Resale-Proof Trade of Information as a Stable Standard of Behavior — An Application of the Theory of Social Situations

Shigeo Muto and Mikio Nakayama
Additional contact information
Shigeo Muto: Tohoku University, Faculty of Economics
Mikio Nakayama: Hosei University, Faculty of Economics

Chapter Essay 11 in Essays in Game Theory, 1994, pp 141-154 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The theory of social situations due to Greenberg is applied to information trading. The solution concept, defined by Nakayama, Quintas, and Muto as a resale-proof trade, is shown to be derived as a unique stable standard of behavior for a situation which we call the information trading situation.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Social Situation; Local Strategy; Information Trading; Stable Standard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-1-4612-2648-2_11

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9781461226482

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_11

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().