The Non-Consistency and Non-Uniqueness of the Consistent Value

Guillermo Owen
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Guillermo Owen: Naval Postgraduate School

Chapter Essay 12 in Essays in Game Theory, 1994, pp 155-162 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract As is well known, Shapley’s value [7] can be obtained in terms of marginal payoffs to players in randomly formed coalitions. Moreover, Hart and MasColell [2] have shown that the value satisfies a consistency property in terms of reduced games (see also Peleg [6]).

Keywords: Convex Hull; Extreme Point; Solution Concept; Marginal Payoff; Consistent Solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_12

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