On the Locus of the Nucleolus

Jos Potters and Stef Tijs
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Jos Potters: University of Nijmegen, KUN Department of Mathematics
Stef Tijs: University of Tilburg, KUB Faculty of Economics

Chapter Essay 14 in Essays in Game Theory, 1994, pp 193-203 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we prove some properties of the locus of the nucleolus of a set C that can be the core of a cooperative game. We show that there are two subsets of C, the kernel and the least core, only dependent on the set C that contain this locus. From this fact we derive that for a set C which is the core of convex game the locus consists of one point. We also give a necessary and sufficient condition that the locus consists of one point.

Keywords: Cooperative Game; Grand Coalition; Convex Game; Full Dimension; Clan Member (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-1-4612-2648-2_14

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_14

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