Entry, Divorce and Re-Marriage in Matching Markets

Elaine Bennett
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Elaine Bennett: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics

Chapter Essay 3 in Essays in Game Theory, 1994, pp 29-38 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper investigates the effect of entry on marriage markets. The paper presents a natural adjustment process for marriage markets and shows that entry on one side of the market makes that side worse off and the other side better off than before entry occurred. An example shows that the adjustment process described by Roth and Vande Vate lacks this property; there may be winners and losers on both sides.

Keywords: Marriage Market; Stable Match; Strict Preference; Assignment Game; Match Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-1-4612-2648-2_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_3

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