Games in Support Function Form: An Approach to the Kernel of NTU Games

Louis J. Billera and Richard P. McLean
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Louis J. Billera: Cornell University, Department of Mathematics and School of Operations Research and Industrial Engineering
Richard P. McLean: Rutgers University, Department of Economics and RUTCOR

Chapter Essay 4 in Essays in Game Theory, 1994, pp 39-49 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we extend the kernel for transferable utility (TU) games to the nontransferable utility (NTU) case using methods of convex analysis. The kernel for TU games was introduced by Davis and Maschler [9] and its mathematical structure was further developed by Maschler and Peleg [15], [16]. The kernel is a subset of the bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley [17], [18].

Keywords: Support Function; Cooperative Game; Coalition Structure; Nash Bargaining Solution; Excess Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-1-4612-2648-2_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_4

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