Non-Zero Sum Repeated Games and Information Transmission

Françoise Forges
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Françoise Forges: CORE, Chercheur qualifié au F.N.R.S.

Chapter Essay 6 in Essays in Game Theory, 1994, pp 65-95 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The pioneering work of Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1968) on infinitely repeated games with incomplete information has obviously given rise to extensions of the Folk theorem. In this paper, we show that their analysis has also provided fundamental hints for the characterization of the solutions of (one-shot) games of information transmission.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Information Transmission; Incomplete Information; Repeated Game; Vector Payoff (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-1-4612-2648-2_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_6

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