On Prize Games

Sergiu Hart

Chapter Essay 8 in Essays in Game Theory, 1994, pp 111-121 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We consider the class of hyperplane coalitional games (Hgames): the feasible set of each coalition is a half-space, with a slope that may vary from one coalition to another. H-games have turned out in various approaches to the value of general non-transferable utility (NTU) games. In this paper we introduce a simple model — prize games — that generates the hyperplane games. Next, we provide an axiomatization for the Maschler & Owen [4] consistent value of H-games.

Keywords: Coalitional Form; Marginal Contribution; Grand Coalition; Payoff Vector; Transferable Utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-1-4612-2648-2_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_8

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