Protecting against Abuses of Cryptosystems in Particular in the Context of Verification of Peace Treaties

Yvo Desmedt
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Yvo Desmedt: Univ. of Wisconsin — Milwaukee, Dept. EE & CS

A chapter in Sequences, 1990, pp 394-405 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Several modern cryptosystems can be abused, or in other words, used for different purposes than intended. Modern signature systems, for example, allow the undersigned to hide an encrypted message in the signature. Avoiding this is crucial in the context of verification of international peace treaties. In this paper we solve the above problem, and in general, demonstrate how one can prevent abuses of cryptosystems.

Keywords: Quadratic Residue; Oblivious Transfer; Covert Channel; Jacobi Symbol; Subliminal Channel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-1-4612-3352-7_31

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4612-3352-7_31

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