Designing an Incentive-Compatible Contract

Todd Kaplan and Arijit Mukherji

Chapter 2 in Economic and Financial Modeling with Mathematica®, 1993, pp 26-57 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract One of the most important problems in modern economics is concerned with the interaction of incentives, information, and economic mechanisms that solve them. This is typically posed as the problem of designing an optimal mechanism using game theory. The solution concept that is used is that of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (or refinements of that concept).

Keywords: Productive Agent; Indifference Curve; High Type; Reservation Utility; Incentive Compatibility Constraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-1-4757-2281-9_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4757-2281-9_2

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