A Game Theoretical Model for Experiment Design Optimization

Lina Mallozzi (), Egidio D’Amato () and Elia Daniele ()
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Lina Mallozzi: Università degli Studi di Napoli “Federico II”, Department of Mathematics and Applications “R. Caccioppoli”
Egidio D’Amato: Università degli Studi di Napoli “Federico II”, Department of Industrial Engineering - Aerospace Section
Elia Daniele: Università degli Studi di Napoli “Federico II”, Department of Industrial Engineering - Aerospace Section

A chapter in Optimization in Science and Engineering, 2014, pp 359-371 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we present a noncooperative game theoretical model for the well known problem of experimental design. A virtual player decides the design variables of an experiment and all the players solve a Nash equilibrium problem by optimizing suitable payoff functions. The resulting game has nice properties, so that a computational procedure is performed by using genetic algorithm approach. We consider the case where the design variables are the coordinates of n points in a region of the plane and we look for the optimal configuration of the points under some constraints. The problem arises from a concrete situation: find the optimal location of n receivers able to pick up particles of cosmic ray in a given platform (some experiment to measure the quantities of gamma rays are ongoing in Nepal thanks to the altitude of the region). Theoretical and computational results are presented for this location problem.

Keywords: Genetic Algorithm; Nash Equilibrium; Location Problem; Payoff Function; Demand Point (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-1-4939-0808-0_18

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4939-0808-0_18

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