Stochastic Coalitional Better-Response Dynamics for Finite Games with Application to Network Formation Games

Konstantin Avrachenkov () and Vikas Vikram Singh ()
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Konstantin Avrachenkov: Inria Sophia Antipolis
Vikas Vikram Singh: Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, Department of Mathematics

Chapter Chapter 10 in Multilevel Strategic Interaction Game Models for Complex Networks, 2019, pp 185-199 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In a repeated play of a strategic game over infinite horizon, a Nash equilibrium that is played in the long run depends on an initial action profile as well as the way all the players choose their actions at each time.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-24455-2_10

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